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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this article is to introduce, interpret, and develop
two incompatible process­ontological theories of personal identity that have
received little attention in analytic metaphysics. The first theory derives from
the notion of personal identity proposed in Alfred North Whitehead’s meta­
physics, but I interpret this notion differently from previous commentators.
The Whiteheadian theory may appeal to those who believe that personal iden­
tity involves an entity or entities that are essentially dynamic, but has nothing
to do with diachronic objectual identity: the (putative) binary equivalence
relation that every entity bears to itself, and only to itself, even after under­
going intrinsic change. The Whiteheadian theory may also find favor with
those who, like Whitehead, reject the possibility of pure processes and hold
that in every becoming, something—which need not be an object, thing, or
individual substance—becomes. The second theory derives from the notion
of recurrent dynamics presented in Johanna Seibt’s General Process Theory.
The Seibtian theory may appeal to those who believe that personal identity
involves not only an entity or entities that are essentially dynamic, but also
the relation of diachronic objectual identity. The Seibtian theory may also
find favor with those who, like Broad and Sellars, find reason to postulate
pure processes.
1. The Problem of Personal Identity
The so­called “persistence problem” of personal identity—how per­
sons can survive intrinsic change—is an instance of the more general
problem of persistence: how temporal entities can survive intrinsic change.
For this reason, most solutions to the persistence problem of personal
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identity accord with one of two general theories of persistence: endurant­
ism, which is associated with three­dimensionalist conceptions of time
and change; or perdurantism, which is associated with four­dimensional­
ist conceptions of time and change.
Theorists (e.g. Gallois) often formulate the persistence question of
personal identity in the following way: What is it for a person existing at
one time to be identical to a person existing at another?
To avoid charges of question­begging “person essentialism” (Olson),
some prefer to formulate the question as follows: Under what possible
circumstances is a person who exists at one time identical with something
that exists at another time (whether or not it is a person then)?
Both formulations make it seem as if the relation of identity must
enter into one’s account of how one and the same entity—in this case, a
person—remains one and the same over time. Given the widely recog­
nized ambiguity of the terms “identity,” “one,” and “same,” however, we
need to clarify what “identity” is supposed to mean in this context.
Many theorists maintain that the kind of identity that is relevant to
the persistence of persons is the extensionally unique, binary equivalence
relation that one entity bears to itself and only to itself even after it un­
dergoes intrinsic change. Following Wehmeier, we can refer to this putative
relation as “diachronic objectual identity,” meaning the binary equiva­
lence relation that every entity bears to itself and only to itself over some
span of time.
Other theorists have resisted the claim that persistence of persons in­
volves objectual identity. Hume, for example, proffers an empiricist theory
of personal identity according to which the self is nothing over and above
(or below) a bundle of perceptions. Perry, to provide another example,
has argued that the relation which is most relevant to the persistence of
persons is not identity per se, but non­transitive unity relations that ob­
tain between distinct person­stages. Similarly, Parfit has argued that the
relation of identity is not “what matters” in our concerns about personal
identity, but rather that what matters are relations of psychological con­
nectedness and continuity.
The issue as to whether personal identity involves objectual identity
is indeed essential, but it is not the only issue that is pertinent to the per­
sistence of persons. Another crucial question—which I will pursue here—is
what kind of entity a person is, such that it can survive change. The con­
sensus has been that persons are either individual substances or substance­like
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particulars. (Since “substance” is said in many ways: I mean the former
to include both traditional substances and non­traditional bundles, and
the latter to include four­dimensional space­time worms and/or stages.)
Here I will introduce and develop two novel and under­appreciated—indeed,
virtually ignored—theories of personal identity, which attempt to explain
how persons persist in consonance with the premise that processes, and
not substances or substance­like particulars, are ontologically fundamen­
tal. As we will see, the two theories diverge on several important points,
including whether the persistence of persons (as processes) involves ob­
jectual identity, whether the notion of process is essentially temporal, and
so on. I have chosen to focus on these and not other process­ontological
theories: first, because they are rigorous, in that they form just part of a
process­philosophical system; second, because of their actual and poten­
tial influence (in process philosophy and analytic metaphysics, respectively);
and third, because each employs a novel, contentious conception of pro­
cesses that affords fruitful comparison with familiar theories.
To begin, I will briefly introduce—but neither evaluate nor en­
dorse—some benefits that process­ontological theories of personal identity
are supposed to have over rival theories.
2. Process­Ontological Motivations
To adequately explain how persons persist, a theory of personal iden­
tity must specify what kind of entity a person is. One familiar view takes
persons to be substances of some kind; that is, entities which are existen­
tially independent, can remain essentially the same even when undergoing
change, and serve as the basis, substrate, or bearer of a person’s acciden­
tal properties, which change over time. Another common view takes
personal identity to amount to identity of consciousness, rather than iden­
tity of substance, and attempts to provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for what counts as one and the same consciousness over time. A third kind
of view takes persons to be bundles or strings of closely connected enti­
ties, such as perceptions (Hume), instantaneous “subjects of
experience­as­single­mental­thing” (G. Strawson), or person­stages (Sider).
A fourth kind of view rejects the existence of persons altogether.
Process­ontological theories of personal identity do not fall neatly
into any of these kinds. The reason is that process ontologists address the
problem from a radically different perspective, according to which the
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basic building blocks of the universe are processes, and not substances or
substance­like particulars. Accordingly, process ontologists generally
maintain that a person is not a substance or substance­like particular that
endures (three­dimensionally) or perdures (four­dimensionally), but rather
is an essentially dynamic phenomenon that is individuated by how it func­
tions—where unity and continuity, as we will see, are principal ontological
features of such functioning.
Rescher and others have claimed that process ontology is especially
germane for capturing the nature of personhood, since
People generally incline to see themselves and their doings in pro­
cessual terms as sources of teleological, agency­purposive activities
geared to the satisfaction of needs and wants as they appear in the
circumstances of the moment. In application to ourselves, at any rate,
static thing­classifiers are naturally distasteful to us. (Rescher 14)
In this way, process ontology is supposed to bypass the epistemic diffi­
culty of ascertaining what we are (statically), by conceiving of what we
are in terms of what we do (dynamically). As Rescher puts it,
There is no problem with experiential access to the processes and
patterns of process that characterize us personally—our doings and
undergoings, either individually or patterned into talents, skills, cap­
abilities, traits, dispositions, habits, inclinations, and tendencies to
action and inaction are, after all, what characteristically define a per­
son as the individual he or she is. (Rescher 15)
That said, there are at least four considerations that motivate Rescher and
others to propose process­ontological theories of personal identity. (To
reiterate, I will not evaluate these considerations here, for I am interested
only in what has motivated some metaphysicians to take this relatively
“revisionary” route.)
First, conceiving of a person as a structured system of processes is
supposed to accord with how we think about ourselves; namely, as rela­
tively stable centers of agency defined by what we do (dynamically),
rather than what we are (statically). Second, process­ontological theories
purportedly do not require us to postulate mysterious, experientially in­
accessible, ad hoc unifying substances; nor do they require us to postulate
mysterious relations in virtue of which static entities become unified into
the dynamic flow of experience. Process­ontological theories, in contrast,
purportedly can capture both the dynamism and relative stability of per­
sonhood in virtue of processes alone, without mysterious postulations.
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Third, and relatedly, process­ontological theories claim to be more parsi­
monious than rival theories. Process ontologists conceive of persons and
their persistence solely in terms of one fundamental kind—processes—in
contrast to more familiar ontologies that postulate multiple kinds, such
as particular substances, universal substantial kinds, particular properties,
and universal property kinds (see Lowe). Finally, process­ontological the­
ories claim to be able to account for the dynamicity of personhood in a
more satisfactory way than traditional conceptions of dynamicity (namely,
as reducible to changes in things or objects), since personhood prima facie
is not object based (McGilvray 245). Process­ontological theories may
therefore have greater explanatory power (Sellars 55), since the constancy
in the flux that is a person (57) could be accounted for by conceiving of
a “person [as] a bundle of absolute processes” (87).
With these considerations serving as a background, I will now intro­
duce, interpret, and develop two incompatible process­ontological theories
of personal identity. The first theory derives from the notion of personal
identity proposed in Whitehead’s metaphysics, but I interpret this notion
differently from previous commentators. The Whiteheadian theory may
appeal to those who believe that personal identity involves an entity or
entities that are essentially dynamic, but has nothing to do with diachro­
nic objectual identity. The Whiteheadian theory may also find favor with
those who, like Whitehead, reject the possibility of pure processes and
hold that in every becoming, something—which need not be an object,
thing, or individual substance—becomes. When we say that persons come
to be, undergo change, and eventually cease to be, what makes our asser­
tions meaningful, from a Whiteheadian point of view, are relationships of
diachronic continuity and unity that obtain between numerically distinct
token­events of a “personal” type. As such, a person, on Whitehead’s view,
is not one entity that remains one and the same over time. Rather, person­
hood involves specific relationships that unify many entities—where such
entities are essentially processual.
The second theory derives from the notion of recurrent dynamics
presented in Seibt’s General Process Theory. The Seibtian theory may ap­
peal to those who believe that personal identity involves not only an entity
or entities that are essentially dynamic, but also the relation of diachron­
ic objectual identity. The Seibtian theory may also find favor with those
who, like Broad and Sellars, find reason to postulate pure processes.
Whereas Whitehead explains personal identity in terms of the diachronic
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continuity and unity that obtain between non­identical person­entities,
Seibt conceives of personal identity as involving one and the same de­
terminable, dynamic individual recurring at different moments. What a
person is at any given moment, according to Seibt, is a generic, subject­
less process that forms one part of a bundle of subjectless processes. Those
pure processes interfere with the person in various ways; and what it means
for a person to persist is for a person­process to survive the interferences
with which it occurs at different moments.
Given that my aim is to introduce and develop these theories, I will
not attempt to adjudicate which is preferable. The purpose of this article
is exploratory, not evaluative. I note in passing, however, that if Wittgenstein,
Hintikka, and Wehmeier are right that objectual identity is both logically
and ontologically dispensable, then the Whiteheadian theory would have
at least this advantage over Seibt’s: it relies in no way on the concept of
diachronic objectual identity, and indeed rules out the possibility of such
a “relation.”
3. Whitehead’s Theory of Personal Identity
Whitehead’s theory of personal identity forms one part of an intricate
system. Accordingly, it will be necessary to introduce several technical
notions that enter into its formulation (though I will have to neglect many
others): actual entities, societies, subjective forms, and formless recep­
tacles. The notion of formless receptacles, I will argue, plays a central
role in Whitehead’s account, yet it has been neglected by previous interpreters.
Whitehead employs the technical terms “actual entity” and “actual
occasion” to refer to the most basic elements of temporal reality. (He em­
ploys the term “eternal object” to refer to the most basic element of
atemporal reality.) Actual entities are ontologically basic, in that they “are
the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going be­
hind actual entities to find anything more real” (PR 18). Actual entities
are atomic, in this sense: they are the basic, ontologically indivisible items
by which anything whatsoever is constituted.
Actual entities often compose more complex units, including socie­
ties, which are organized complexes of many actual entities. Societies
differ from actual entities in that they are self­sustaining, persist, and have
a history; and persons count as a specific kind of society (AI 233ff.). Be­
fore we examine what kind of society a person is, however, I need to
introduce some of the abstract structures that enable actual entities and
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societies to come into being. Grasping the complementary functions of
these structures will enable us to appreciate the personal identity of a per­
son qua society.
Whitehead holds that although actual entities qua atoms are ontolog­
ically indivisible, the power of intellectual abstraction enables us to analyze
an actual entity “into modes of functioning which jointly constitute its
process of becoming” (AI 176; PR 219). This formulation reminds us that
the category of actual entities is a process­ontological postulate: actual
entities are dynamic processes, are receivings of aspects from past occa­
sions, and are not the ontologically derivative doings of substance­like
particulars. Unlike traditional substances, moreover, the actual entities
that Whitehead describes cannot persist beyond the moment that they
come into being. No two actual entities are ever identical, since every re­
ceiving at every moment is ontologically distinct from all others. Whitehead
often expresses this thesis by claiming that every actual entity is novel
and absolutely individual: every occasion is both self­identical and nu­
merically distinct from all other occasions of becoming. Correlatively,
Whitehead’s axioms rule out the possibility of synchronic and diachronic
objectual identity.
That said, the novelty of every occasion does not entail that they are
ontologically isolated, “windowless monads.” The fact that actual enti­
ties are syntheses of aspects taken from past occasions means that there
can be, and often is, significant continuity between distinct occasions.
Part of what it means for an actual entity to be essentially dynamic is that
its mode of being is a novel synthesis of aspects inherited from other oc­
casions, which subsequently can contribute aspects of itself to the becoming
of future occasions. Whitehead expresses this thesis idiomatically by
claiming that actual entities are subject­superjects:
It is fundamental to the metaphysical doctrine of the philosophy of
organism, that the notion of an actual entity as the unchanging sub­
ject of change is completely abandoned. An actual entity is at once
the subject experiencing and the superject of its experiences. … It has
become a ‘being’; and it belongs to the nature of every ‘being’ that it
is a potential for every ‘becoming.’ (PR 43ff.)
Any entity is a subject, in that it is that which becomes in its atemporal,
“algorithmic” process of synthesizing aspects inherited from other occa­
sions (Smith 219ff.). Every entity is also a superject, in that what
becomes—the entity as subject—can allow aspects of itself to be inherited
Generated for EBSCO inc.  2015/2/15 © 2015 Philosophy Documentation Center http://www.pdcnet.org
11
by future entities. More specifically, entities’ superjective character en­
ables the same aspects—not entities—to be transmitted repeatedly in
future occasions; and this, in turn, makes possible the continuity and con­
nectedness of nature. The fact that relations of continuity can obtain
between numerically distinct occasions of experience is crucial for
Whitehead’s theory of personal identity, for it is in virtue of the continu­
ity between distinct experiences that they may become cohesive parts of
one (whole) life.
However, if every temporally basic item is an activity that differs
from all others, including even its immediate predecessors and successors,
then how is diachronic continuity possible? In particular, how can rela­
tions of continuity obtain between token occasions of the personal type?
Here we are not so far from what perplexed Hume: how distinct items—in
Hume’s case, perceptions, and in the present case, actual occasions—can
be really and not just imaginarily connected.
Whitehead’s technical term for what makes diachronic continuity pos­
sible is an entity’s “subjective form”; and he claims that every entity
necessarily has some subjective form that provides the pattern for that en­
tity’s becoming.1 Consider your experience at the present moment, for
example. (Note, however, that “subjective” in “subjective form” need not
imply the subjectivity of a conscious personality. Even non­conscious en­
tities such as quarks are supposed to have subjective forms.) On Whitehead’s
view, your conscious and unconscious beliefs, desires, intentions, values,
dispositions, emotions, and so on, shape the way in which you are exper­
iencing your environment at this moment. A difference in the underlying
form of your experience—say, if you were extremely thirsty—would nec­
essarily entail a difference in the qualitative character of your experience.
Were you thirsty, the words on this page would seem less interesting than
a glass of water, and you might fixate on water at the cost of focusing on
the text. The entire “affective tone” of your experience would differ; and
Whitehead would explain this difference in tone in terms of differences
in the underlying form of your experience—how you are experiencing the
present moment. Taking this example as one paradigm of a complex ac­
tual occasion, Whitehead holds that any occasion whatsoever has the
content or “matter” of its being shaped or “formed” by underlying pos­
sibilities, dispositions, tendencies, and so on.
Subjective forms serve at least two important functions, which are
necessary for the possibility of personal identity. First, an entity’s subjective
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form provides the shape or “form” for the content or “matter” of that en­
tity’s becoming. Whitehead conceives of actual entities as determinate
unities of otherwise diverse aspects that have been “prehended” from past
occasions. For diverse aspects to become determinately unified into a new
occasion, and thus for an occasion of experience to be possible, these pre­
hended aspects must be unified in some way—that is, commensurately
with some form. For me to have a meaningful experience, for example, a
multiplicity of sensuous, cognitive, and other data must acquire a rela­
tively unified shape. In the absence of such a shape, a way for the multiple
to be integrated into one, it would not be possible for there to be any ex­
perience, let alone this experience of writing here, now.
The upshot for Whitehead’s theory of personal identity is that the a
priori conditions for the possibility of experience include some form that
a putative experience may take. A person can enjoy an experience only if
there are some background conditions—beliefs, desires, intentions, val­
ues, dispositions, tendencies, emotions, and so on—that enable the
experience to occur.
The first function that subjective forms serve, then, is to make syn­
chronic unity possible: they enable diverse contents to acquire determinate
shape at specific moments. Subjective forms also fulfill a second func­
tion: they make diachronic continuity possible. Imagine listening to a
rapturous musical performance. The performance consists of moments
that follow one another in immediate succession, and we experience the
performance as being continuous throughout this succession. The con­
tinuity of our experiences naturally gives rise to the belief that each moment
is part of one and the same (whole) performance; and we ordinarily refer
to such continuous occurrences as one event, as in “the life­changing free­
jazz performance that I witnessed at Chicago’s Velvet Lounge in 2004.”
Whitehead maintains that such expressions, while sufficient for every­
day life, are metaphysically misleading. For although we experience the
performance as one temporally continuous event, in fact “the performance”
denotes a series of distinct, novel experiences, none of which is identical
to any other. The occasions of experience, furthermore, are not static,
four­dimensional slices that somehow jointly constitute the experience as
of a continuous performance. Rather, on Whitehead’s view, the individu­
al occasions are dynamic processes in their own right. The issue that
Whitehead must address, then, is how absolutely distinct experiences can
be diachronically continuous.
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Whitehead’s response involves highlighting the aspects that recur in
successive subjective forms. From a Whiteheadian point of view, dia­
chronic continuity is possible precisely because the same parts of one
whole subjective form can recur in the numerically distinct subjective
forms that shape different moments (see Kraus 68). Take the anxiety one
feels when watching a well­executed horror film, for example. The sense
of anxiety accompanying each moment of the film is possible because of
an element that recurs in the subjective forms underlying each moment
of watching the film: namely, a disposition towards feeling anxious. Put
differently, it is in virtue of the recurring disposition towards anxiety that
a person’s experiences can be continuous across different moments. Gen­
eralizing from this specific case: Whitehead claims that we experience
multiple events as continuous precisely because of various elements that
recur in the subjective forms underlying those events. What matters is not
identity of subjective form, but elements that recur in numerically dis­
tinct subjective forms.
Fittingly, the doctrine of novelty, which I introduced above in con­
nection with actual entities, applies also to subjective forms: “…in the
becoming of an actual entity, novel prehensions, nexuses, subjective forms,
propositions, multiplicities, and contrasts, also become” (PR 22). Although
one part of a whole subjective form may fulfill a common function in sev­
eral successive occasions, and thus be said with qualification to remain
“the same” over time, this does not entail that whole subjective forms can
remain identical over time. The doctrine of novelty expressly forbids that
possibility.
The upshot of this interpretation for Whitehead’s theory of personal
identity is that subjective forms make possible both the synchronic unity
of a personal experience, and the diachronic continuity of multiple per­
sonal experiences. Both of these functions are necessary for the possibility
of personal identity. I contend that they are not jointly sufficient, however;
for on their own, subjective forms are not capable of unifying unique ex­
periences into the becoming of one whole life. What still needs to be
explained is how distinct occasions of the person­type are not only syn­
chronically and diachronically continuous, but also diachronically unified.
That function, I claim, is supposed to be fulfilled—however success­
fully—by an abstract structure that Whitehead discusses in Adventures of
Ideas: formless receptacles.
Whitehead explicitly takes the “inescapable fact” of personal unity,
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not identity of subjective form, to lie at the heart of personal identity:
In our account of human experience we have attenuated human per­
sonality into a genetic relation between occasions of human
experience. Yet personal unity is an inescapable fact . . . . Evidently
there is a fact to be accounted for. Any philosophy must provide some
doctrine of personal identity. In some sense there is a unity in the life
of each man, from birth to death. (AI 186)
Whitehead would grant that belief in personal identity as identity is con­
stitutive of human experience. But Whitehead would also insist, here in
qualified agreement with Hume, that strong belief in a simple and identi­
cal self does not prove the existence of such a self. On the contrary,
Whitehead would maintain that belief in personal identity as identity is
partly grounded in the synchronic unity and diachronic continuity made
possible by subjective forms. Indeed, Whitehead holds that our conscious­
ness of the self­identity that pervades the “life­thread” and “personal
order” of our experiences provides us with direct knowledge of the syn­
chronic unity and diachronic continuity of experience. He also maintains
that past subjective forms of self­experience are almost always continu­
ous with those of the present (AI 183). But personal identity, for Whitehead,
has nothing to do with identity per se. Personal identity is a matter of dia­
chronic unity.
Several interpreters have criticized Whitehead’s theory of personal
identity for failing to accord with the commonsense belief that judgments
about personal identity involve identity, and not merely relations of unity
and continuity. Cobb, for example, has argued that since Whitehead’s the­
ory of personal identity categorically precludes the possibility of objectual
identity through time, it poses serious difficulties for any doctrine of life
after death, and
It poses many other problems as well. Our ordinary moral and legal
practice presupposes personal identity. If there is no such personal
identity, all justification for rewards and punishments seems to van­
ish. It would seem that there is no particular necessity to accept
responsibility for our past acts, since they were performed by numer­
ically different entities. Gratitude would seem to be misdirected when
expressed after the moment of the beneficent act. Past promises
would not bind. This list of consequences is endless and disastrous.
(Cobb 35ff.)
Although Cobb rightly points out Whitehead’s lingering concern as to
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whether his system provides an adequate account of personal identity, I
believe that Cobb, Weiss, Sherburne, and others have overlooked how
Whitehead addresses his own concern—namely, by introducing an ab­
stract structure, the sole function of which is to unify ontologically and
temporally distinct occasions. For this reason, the key to understanding
Whitehead’s theory of personal identity lies in grasping the complemen­
tary functions that subjective forms and formless receptacles fulfill for
persons, qua societies of a specific type.
Whitehead delivers his most explicit characterization of personal iden­
tity by adapting a passage from Plato’s Timaeus, claiming that “it is
impossible to improve upon” Plato’s passage. Whitehead’s adaptation
makes liberal use of the notion of a receptacle, which he derives from
Plato’s more general “Receptacle or Locus whose sole function is the im­
position of a unity upon the events of Nature” (AI 187).2 Like Plato’s
Receptacle (capital ‘R’), which imposes unity upon all events by making
them part of the same universe, a person’s receptacle (small ‘r’) imposes
unity upon the events of his or her life. A person’s receptacle, in other
words, makes it such that distinct occasions become and are experienced
as constitutive parts of one whole life. A person’s receptacle is formless,
however, in that it does not require any specific kind of experience or uni­
fication to take place. On account of a person’s receptacle, any token
experience of the personal type becomes a constitutive part of that per­
son’s life, no matter how discordant that occasion may be with the person’s
previous experiences, beliefs, desires, intentions, values, dispositions,
tendencies, and so on. Whitehead expresses this idea by contending that
a person’s formless receptacle receives “all manners of experiences into
its own unity,” without imposing conditions on what that unity must con­
sist in (AI 187). Whitehead assigns the latter function of imposing specific
conditions, as we have seen, to subjective forms (and eternal objects,
given the constraints that they impose on potential prehensions). A per­
son’s receptacle, in contrast, is simply that in virtue of which the person’s
experiences belong to one and the same life; and it fulfills this function
by unifying ontologically and temporally distinct occasions of the per­
sonal type.
Because Whitehead introduces the notion of a formless receptacle
specifically to explain how personal experiences become diachronically
unified, the introduction of formless receptacles may seem ad hoc. I will
not pursue that criticism here.3
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Given Whitehead’s doctrine of novelty, it would be wrong to think
that a person’s formless receptacle remains identical over time, and thereby
serves as the diachronically identical substrate to which all of a person’s
experiences belong. Fittingly, Whitehead explicitly rejects the notion that
a person’s receptacle could remain identical over time, for the receptacle
“of the becomings of the occasions of our experience” is itself “changed
and variously figured by the things that enter it; so that it differs in its
character at different times” (AI 187). Any experience that enters into a
receptacle alters both the receptacle itself and the person’s history, without
having to conform to specific conditions as to what that history must be.
For this reason, Whitehead sometimes refers to receptacles as “the foster­
mother… of the becoming of our occasions of experience” (187). Recep­
tacles are foster­mothers, in that they receive any experience and unify it
with a person’s previous experiences. A person’s receptacle can thus be
said to “persist” only insofar as it performs the same function at different
moments. Further, receptacles are individuated—not as actual entities,
but as abstract functions—by what they do: unifying the actual occasions
that enter into them, even as those occasions change and variously figure
that into which they enter.
The interpretation that I have been developing might lead one to think
that persons are formless receptacles. But that cannot be right: persons
and receptacles exhibit different formal features. Persons are not recep­
tacles; persons have receptacles. Receptacles perform a crucial function
for persons; namely, unifying distinct experiences.
I have claimed that receptacles function as loci of diachronic unity
for persons. But I have not yet explained what persons are, such that syn­
chronic unity of individual experiences, and diachronic continuity and
unity of between multiple experiences, is possible. For the sake of brev­
ity, I will answer by introducing five conditions, each of which specifies
its predecessor.
First, persons are not actual entities per se, but societies (see Leclerc
66). Societies are organized complexes of actual occasions that exhibit
more internal structure than mere set­theoretical gatherings (see Hartshorne
177ff.). Furthermore, unlike actual occasions, which cannot persist be­
yond the moment at which they come into existence, societies necessarily
are temporally extended, self­sustaining, and have a history. As Whitehead
puts it, “the society, as such, must involve antecedents and subsequents.
In other words, a society must exhibit the peculiar quality of endurance”
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(AI 203). At this point it should be clear that endurance, as Whitehead
conceives of it, has nothing to do with endurantism, three­dimensional­
ism, or objectual identity. Rather, Whiteheadian endurance concerns the
recurrence of various elements in the subjective forms of a society’s ex­
periences.
Second, as societies, persons satisfy a particular genetic condition on
how they endure through time (see Wallack 91). Specifically, persons ex­
hibit social order, meaning that every occasion of the society’s becoming
exemplifies some defining characteristics that differentiate the society as
both the type and token process that it is. A person exhibits social order,
then, in that: (i) the defining characteristics of the immediate past par­
tially constrain the person’s present becoming; and (ii) the defining
characteristics of the present partially constrain the person’s future be­
comings (see Hartshorne 181). Persons not only maintain themselves via
the preservation of their defining characteristics, but also impose con­
straints—via subjective forms—on what future occasions can count as
parts of one and the same society. This is what it means for persons qua
societies to be self­sustaining.
Third, persons are societies that exhibit not only social order, but per­
sonal order. Persons exhibit personal order, in that their experiences are
serially ordered and follow immediately from their predecessors: “ . . .
personal order means one­dimensional serial order” (AI 188). The fact
that a person’s successive experiences exhibit one­dimensional serial order
makes it possible for a continuous thread of inherited characteristics to
endure through them. This is crucial for Whitehead’s theory, because the
linear seriality of a person’s experiences makes it possible for that per­
son’s formless receptacle to unify the experiences into one life.
Fourth, persons are personal societies that exhibit the relative dom­
inance, central direction, and unified control of a central personality or
intelligence. When I will my body to move in various ways, for example,
the living structured nexus of occasions that my body is obeys the inten­
tions directed at it by my central intelligence. This applies not only to my
physical body, however, for I can also take control of myself emotionally,
and thereby introduce not only physical, but cognitive novelty into the
flow of my experience. Such forms of control are characteristic of personhood.
Conditions one through four are still not jointly sufficient to charac­
terize human persons, however, for animals such as chimpanzees and
dolphins may exhibit all of the aforementioned features. For this reason,
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a fifth and final condition is needed: the capacity for self­consciousness.
In the case of single cells, of vegetation, and of the lower forms of
animal life, we have no ground for conjecturing living personality.
But in the case of the higher animals there is central direction, which
suggests that in their case each animal body harbours a living person,
or living persons. Our own self­consciousness is direct awareness of
ourselves as such persons. (PR 107)
Fifth, then, persons have the capacity for self­consciousness: that is, aware­
ness of themselves as societies that meet conditions one through five. To
be self­aware, in the Whiteheadian sense, is to recognize oneself as a so­
ciety that involves an influx of the other into the self­identity of the present,
yet can persist through such changes by integrating them and introducing
novelty through intentional action (AI 181).
Putting everything together, we have arrived at an interpretation of
Whitehead’s theory of personal identity that does justice both to PR and
the supplementations introduced elsewhere, particularly in AI. On
Whitehead’s view, personal identity has nothing to do with objectual iden­
tity, but rather concerns the diachronic unity of novel experiences. The
diachronic unity of human experience is made possible by a formless re­
ceptacle that belongs to each person—that is, to each personal society that
exhibits a central intelligence, and is capable of recognizing itself as such
an intelligence. Formless receptacles are not sufficient for personal iden­
tity, however, for human experience is also synchronically unified and
diachronically continuous; and subjective forms enable human experience
to be synchronically unified and diachronically continuous. Consequently,
subjective forms and formless receptacles are jointly sufficient for per­
sonal identity—with the qualification that the kind of entity that undergoes
the experiences meets conditions one through five.
4. Seibt’s Theory of Personal Identity
Although Seibt has not published an extended treatment of personal
identity, we can infer the essentials of such a theory from the notion of
recurrent dynamics that forms the basis of her process­ontological theory
of persistence. Like’s Whitehead’s theory, Seibt’s theory of persistence is
one part of an intricate system; so it will be necessary to introduce sev­
eral features of Seibt’s system to appreciate what it has to offer.
Seibt develops her system in opposition to substance ontologists and
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even Whitehead, for she criticizes them for failing to recognize the
categorial separability of individuality, countability, and particularity.
Seibt’s Sellars­inspired criticisms derive from meta­linguistic factors con­
cerning the “category implications” of the denotations of mass nouns and
activity verbs, and the corresponding categorial inferences that she takes
to be licensed in English and its truth­functional translation equivalents.
For present purposes, we can set aside the details of these analyses. The
important point is that recognizing the separability of the aforementioned
category features, according to Seibt, enables one to postulate kinds of
entity that otherwise seem inadmissible—specifically, entities that are not
only essentially individual, but also non­countable and non­particular.
The two suppositions that have most detrimentally hindered analytic
ontology, Seibt contends, are the following:
(SUB1) Principle of Individuality: All and only concrete individuals
are countable, determinate particulars.
(SUB2) Principle of Categorial Dualism: An entity is either particu­
lar or general (universal), and never neither nor both.4
Seibt argues that (SUB1) and (SUB2) are overly restrictive “linkage prin­
ciples” that preclude certain modes of being from characterizing the same
kind of entity. For example: if all and only individuals are particulars
(SUB1), then an entity’s individuality—its ontological distinctness from
other entities—necessarily implies its particularity, that it necessarily oc­
curs in only one spatiotemporal location whenever it occurs. If all individuals
are particulars, moreover, and any entity must be either a particular or a
universal (SUB2), it follows that no individual can be general: potentially
occurrent in different spatial regions at the same time.
In opposition to (SUB1) and (SUB2), Seibt—following Sellars
(87)—develops a system that postulates only one fundamental kind: dy­
namic individuals that are non­countable, determinable, and general. Seibt
explicitly distinguishes her process­ontological system from Whitehead’s.
Whitehead allegedly employs (SUB1), because what it means to be an ac­
tual entity is not only to be an individual that is distinct from all others,
but also and necessarily a concrete, countable, particular, and determinate
individual. Whitehead also purportedly employs (SUB2)—and this, des­
pite his insistence on the inadequacy of the traditional distinction between
particulars and universals (PR 20, 48ff.)—because he postulates two mu­
tually exclusive, fundamental kinds: actual entities, which are particular;
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and eternal objects, which are general.
Seibt argues that modes of being that have traditionally been thought
to be either necessarily co­extensional (such as individuality, countabil­
ity, particularity, determinateness, concreteness, etc.), or necessarily
mutually exclusive (such as particularity/generality, concrete/universal,
etc.), are not. Denying (SUB1) and (SUB2) enables Seibt to postulate a
novel kind of entity, general processes, which are individual, non­count­
able, non­particular, determinable, and functional, as opposed to
spatiotemporally individuated. Seibt goes on to claim that general pro­
cesses ontologically ground and adequately explain all other kinds, including
medium­sized dry goods and persons; so fittingly, Seibt refers to her sys­
tem as “General Process Theory,” or GPT, for short.
In addition to recognizing heretofore inadmissible combinations of
category features, the second putative advantage of GPT is its alleged
parsimony and explanatory power. Seibt contends that GPT provides truth­
makers for all of our categorial inferences, including those we make about
non­countable masses and subjectless activities; and that it does so by
postulating only one fundamental kind and one fundamental relation:
namely, a non­classical, non­transitive “part of” relation, in virtue of which
overlapping general processes can constitute higher­level entities such as
persons (“Dynamic” 252ff.). A third putative advantage of GPT is that its
theory of persistence allegedly “transcends” and obviates recalcitrant de­
bates between endurantists and perdurantists. At the same time, Seibt’s
theory of recurrent dynamics is supposed to more adequately capture the
dynamicity that is characteristic of spatiotemporal existence, including
the dynamicity of personhood.
To describe a theory of personal identity that is consistent with the
core theses of GPT, it will be helpful to examine the material phenomena
that general processes are supposed to represent: subjectless activities. In
contrast to substance ontologists, who take things to accurately reflect on­
tological structure, and Whitehead, who purportedly takes minds to
accurately reflect ontological structure, Seibt proposes a model that is
supposed to account for a much wider range of phenomena, and more ac­
curately and adequately at that. An activity, as Seibt conceives of it, is not
an abstract type, but a concrete mode of occurrence, a way of occurring:
“Our concept of an activity is the concept of how something is happen­
ing (“Free” 31). Seibt recognizes that some activities are constitutively
tied to subjects. But other activities, Seibt claims, are patently subjectless,
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in that there is no bearer that necessarily participates in the occurrence,
no determinate that­to­which the activity in question necessarily belongs.
A subjectless activity, then, is some determinable way of occurring in
space and time, in relation to which there is not necessarily some thing
or person that owns or undergoes the process. In Seibt’s words, a subject­
less activity “is an occurrence that might involve, but is not, the doing or
acting of a person or thing (or of a collection of persons or things)”
(“Beyond” 147). Subjectless activities are thus supposed to be identity
independent, “in the sense that their occurrence in space and time does
not necessarily require the existence of a different sort of entity they occur
in or qualify” (“Particulars” 48). Clearly, the conception of process that
Seibt employs differs markedly from that of substance ontologists, ac­
cording to whom processes essentially and asymmetrically depend for
their identity on essentially independent particulars, such as individual
substances.
Like Sellars, Seibt finds evidence for the existence of subjectless
activities—qua truth­makers—in sentences that have dummy subjects,
such as “it is buzzing,” “it is raining,” “the fire is burning,” and “electro­
magnetic radiation is traveling through empty space.” Indeed, Seibt holds
that sentences with dummy subject terms are meaningful precisely be­
cause subjectless activities exist and serve as the denotations of such
subject terms. Seibt finds further evidence for subjectless activities in the
language we use to describe force­like natural phenomena, such as shifts
in barometric pressure, the Hubble expansion of the universe, and so on
(see Rescher 5).5
Crucially, what individuates a subjectless activity is its distinctive
mode of occurrence—that is, its purely functional or qualitative charac­
ter relative to some dynamic context—and not its spatiotemporal location:
“Subjectless activities are individuated in terms of their role within a dy­
namic context, rather than by their location in space and time” (“Particulars”
48; also see “Process” 20). This claim is crucial for Seibt’s purposes, for
she takes this fact about how subjectless activities are individuated to en­
tail that they are not only concrete, like traditional particulars, but also
multiply occurrent, like traditional universals—and this directly contra­
venes (SUB1) and (SUB2):
non­countables are both or neither particular and general entities.
Masses and activities, the prime examples of non­countables, have
concrete physical properties and are thus concrete; but they are
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multiply occurrent like general entities—you and I, we may have the
same stuff in our glasses and when we drink from them we engage in
the same activity. (“Dynamic” 249)
Since subjectless activities can involve either zero or many different spa­
tiotemporal particulars, Seibt infers that one and the same subjectless
activity (e.g., flowing or bubbling) or dynamic mass (e.g., water or wine)
can occur in several, distinct, and possibly disjoint spatial regions at the
same time.
The fact that subjectless activities are functionally individuated is
also supposed to entail that they can recur at different moments. Subject­
less activities are general or multiply occurrent, then, in that they can
occur in multiple spatial locations at the same time, and recur at multiple
moments. The upshot for the GPT theory of personal identity, as we will
see, is that the persistence of persons amounts to one and the same dy­
namically individuated, multiply occurrent individual recurring at different
moments. What a person is, according to GPT, is a spatiotemporally ex­
tended, non­countable, determinable individual that is individuated by
how it functions in dynamic contexts—that is, the distinct way in which
it occurs in space and recurs over time.
Take yourself, for example. Seibt holds that you are (literally) a gen­
eral, dynamic, individual mode of occurrence that interferes with its
environment in a way that is functionally, qualitatively, and numerically
distinct from all other entities—that is, processes. No other process inter­
feres with its environment in exactly the same way as you; and the way
in which the processes in your environment interfere with you differs from
the way in which they interfere with any other entity, including other per­
sons. Seibt also maintains that you are essentially a determinable, and not
a determinate kind of being. Your determinable qualities—your disposi­
tions, tendencies, and so on—become determinate when you interfere with
other general processes, such as the process of raining and the process of
singing, which compose the bundle of pure processes denoted by “I was
singing in the rain (there, then).” In this way, the functional and qualita­
tive features that individuate you, and make you the very entity that you
are, occur at the same time, and in the same spatial region, as other pro­
cesses that further determine your relatively general features. To express
the point in Seibt’s idiom: concurrently occurring processes destructively,
neutrally, or constructively interfere with the dynamic individual that you
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are and remain, even as those specific determinations change or cease.
Accordingly, in GPT, processes of change are tantamount to processes
of interference. If you are pensive at t1, relieved at t2, and elated at t3, for
example, then there is one dynamic, relatively generic individual—you—that
recurs throughout that interval, even as other processes (which cause you
to be pensive, relieved, and elated, respectively) interfere with you. Such
interfering processes are said to be specifications or further determina­
tions of your essential features. To persist through change, then, means
to dynamically survive various interferences at multiple levels of specifi­
cation. These interferences include the most determinate kind of interference,
termed ultimate specifications, which are so inextricably interwoven with
a single moment that they cannot survive beyond it. The dynamic indi­
vidual denoted by “Phenomenally, here, now, in this very experience, I
perceive the lush growth of my grandmother’s rubber plant outside of my
window,” for example, is ultimately specific in virtue of the indexicality
of “here,” “now,” and “this” (see Smith). It cannot recur at another mo­
ment. At best, it can closely resemble other ultimately specific processes
that occur at immediately preceding and successive moments. The rela­
tively generic, dynamic individual denoted by “I,” in contrast, can and
does recur at other moments.
The upshot for Seibt’s conception of personal identity is that a per­
son changes by interfering with relatively specific dynamics at different
moments, and survives by recurring relatively “generically” at each of
those moments. Personal identity thus involves one and the same gener­
ic individual recurring at multiple moments of time, concurrently with
specifications of that person­process which destructively, neutrally, or
constructively interfere with it. As such, the GPT conception of personal
identity is the kind of bundle theory of personal identity that Sellars en­
visioned in his initial reflections about absolute processes (Sellars 87).
Seibt maintains that personal identity must be understood in terms of
the relation of objectual identity, rather than diachronic unity (“Dynamic”
275; “Beyond” 134, 158ff.). In contrast to Whitehead, then, for whom
diachronic identity is ipso facto impossible, and for whom a part of a
whole may remain “the same” only in a qualified sense, Seibt holds that
numerically the same generic process may recur on multiple occasions.
What we need to complete the GPT account of personal identity are
the kinds of conditions we covered above in connection with Whitehead.
Seibt has not yet provided such conditions. If medium­sized dry goods
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and indeed all potentially persistent entities are generic processes, however,
then we need an account of what distinctive dispositions, tendencies, and
capacities would serve to differentiate persons from other types of per­
sistent entities. The GPT conception of personal identity entails that persons
are “spatially minimally homomerous”—that is, that none of a person’s
parts is a process of the same, relatively high level as the person herself.
This might lead one to think that minimal homomerity in space consti­
tutes a person qua person. The feature of minimal homomerity in space,
however, is not sufficiently explanatory to individuate persons qua per­
sons, for medium­sized dry goods also (allegedly) exemplify this feature.
One charitable line of interpretation might follow the sketch suggested
above, and define a GPT­person as a distinctive set of dispositions, ten­
dencies, etc., that acquire further determination through various interferences.
But until we know precisely what makes a GPT­person a person, and not
some other kind of entity, it will remain unclear as to whether Seibt’s dis­
tinction between generic and specific processes is absolute or relative;
and thus whether that distinction, so understood, is adequate to the task
of explaining how persons survive the inexorable flux of existence in time.
5. “Revisionary” Metaphysics
P. F. Strawson characterizes projects such as Aristotle’s, Kant’s, and
his own as instances of descriptive metaphysics, which aims “to lay bare
the most general features of our conceptual structure,” that is, the “cat­
egories and concepts which, in their most fundamental character, change
not at all” (Strawson 9­10). Strawson conceives of revisionary metaphys­
ics, on the other hand, as being concerned to produce better conceptual
structures. Yet even the best revisionary theories, by Strawson’s lights,
are valuable only insofar as they are “at the service of descriptive meta­
physics” (ibid.). The implication is that descriptive metaphysics reveals
actual structure (see Kriegel 1ff.), whereas revisionary theories are use­
ful only instrumentally, insofar as they remind us of the inexorable
categories and concepts of descriptive metaphysics, which “[need] no jus­
tification at all beyond that of inquiry in general” (Strawson 9). One
concept of descriptive metaphysics, Strawson goes on to claim, is that
there is “a general identifiability­dependence of processes which things
undergo upon the things which undergo them, and not vice versa” (57).
Concordantly, standard substance ontologies, such as Aristotle’s, Kant’s,
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Ingarden’s, P. F. Strawson’s, Lowe’s, et al., count as descriptive, whereas
non­standard ontologies are revisionary, hence valuable only insofar as
they remind us of the permanent categories and concepts presupposed by
“our” universal conceptual structure—the structure described by substance
ontology.
I find it doubtful that the distinction between descriptive and revi­
sionary metaphysics is as sharp as Strawson suggests; and it is questionable
whether the distinction is of any philosophical utility. Regardless, the sa­
lient point is that it can be extremely useful to examine “revisionary”
theories, even if one is convinced, as so many are, of the accuracy and
adequacy of substance ontology. The reason is that examination of revi­
sionary theories either clarifies the descriptive categories and concepts
that underlie thought per se, and thus is of instrumental value; or intro­
duces genuinely new categories and concepts for thought, and thus is of
intrinsic value. This reminds us of Mill’s spirited defense of what one
might call revisionary or radical inquiry:
since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or
never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions
that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.
[And] even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole
truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earn­
estly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the
manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its ra­
tional grounds. (Mill 50)
Here I have attempted to occasion two collisions of the kind that Mill en­
visioned. I have done so, moreover, with reservations about the viability
of process ontology. Is it conceivable that processes alone—whether of
the Whiteheadian or Sellarsian/Seibtian type—could be exclusively fun­
damental? Having reflected on the question for years, I am still uncertain.
Is it metaphysically possible that processes alone could be exclusively
fundamental? Perhaps—but I must postpone an investigation of these is­
sues for another occasion (Siakel, “Atemporal”). Regardless of how one
answers these questions, however, process­ontological theories of person­
al identity provide compelling explanations of the dynamicity—and
fragility—of personhood.
ENDNOTES
1. Subjective forms are determined by the eternal objects that an actual en­
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tity selects as being relevant to its becoming. More specifically, subjective
forms receive their determination from a member of the subjective species
of eternal objects, which “defines the subjective form of feeling of one actu­
al entity” (PR 164, 291).
2. Whitehead claims that the essential function of Plato’s Receptacle is marked
by different terms in the philosophies of Lucretius, Descartes, and Leibniz
(AI 150).
3. For a critical assessment of Whitehead’s theory, as interpreted here, see
Siakel, “Reassessing.”
4. Seibt’s way of numbering of the “twenty or so” substance­ontological pre­
suppositions that she identifies differs, depending on the article. Apropos,
the way in which I have designated (SUB1) and (SUB2) does not match all
of Seibt’s publications.
5. I worry that the notion of a subjectless activity may be inconceivable, if
perhaps metaphysically possible. Throughout her work, Seibt does not provide
an argument to establish the notion. Instead, she (like Sellars and Rescher)
introduces contentious examples to motivate the intuition that bearerless
activities exist. In every alleged illustration that Seibt provides, however, the
process in question does seem to be constitutively tied to some subject or
other, even if that subject or set of subjects changes over time, or that sub­
ject is merely some region of space­time. The processes that Seibt describes
may not depend for their existence on one specific spatiotemporal particular
or group of particulars; but they do seem to essentially and generically de­
pend for their existence on some non­processual subject or other, in virtue of
which those processes can occur. Indeed, it would seem to belong to the very
nature of a process—even on purportedly revisionary conceptions of what a
process is—to necessarily involve some subject or set of subjects, in virtue
of which that process can exist as the kind of entity that it is. A fortiori, from
the fact that some processes do not essentially depend for their existence on
some specific entity or set of entities, it does not follow that processes per
se are identity independent. For further elaboration of this worry, see Siakel,
“Atemporal.”
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